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FOREWORD
The future direction of Russian security and defense
policies is a fundamental issue in contemporary world politics.
Future Russian policies will have a major impact on all nuclear
issues; on bilateral relations with the United States; and on
European, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Far Eastern
security. One primary indicator of the direction of Russian
policies is the new Defense Doctrine published in November 1993.
This document has aroused much controversy and diverging
assessments as to its significance. However, since it encompasses
all the major issues in Russia's security and defense agenda, it
is a major statment that is crucial to any understanding of
Russian trends and policies.
Because of the controversy over Russian doctrine, the
Strategic Studies Institute, as part of its ongoing coverage of
Russian defense and security policies, presents here two very
different assessments of that doctrine to contribute to the
debate over its meaning. The Institute is not offering an
official interpretation of the new doctrine. While both authors
work for the Defense Department, they differ in their assessments
and are expressing only their personal opinions, not those of any
government agency. We hope that our audience will find these
presentations stimulating and thought provoking.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In the past decade, Soviet/Russian military doctrine has
experienced startling changes both in content and in the role
such doctrine will play in protecting the vital interests of the
state. This report focuses upon efforts during and after the
Gorbachev era to establish clear national security priorities and
to enumerate the ways in which military doctrine might ensure
protection of the Russian national interest.
Since 1987, when the Soviet Union switched to an ostensibly
defensive military doctrine, the nature of this doctrine has been
a contentious issue in both Soviet/Russian policies and Western
perceptions of these policies. This controversy has persisted.
The most recent iteration of Russia's defense doctrine was
published, with President Yeltsin's signature, in November 1993.
It immediately aroused controversy in the West as being a
restatement of old Soviet themes, a document for an imperial
conception of defense policy, an enshrinement of military
superiority over civilians in defense policy, and so forth. On
the other hand, a rival current of opinion argued for its novelty
and recognition of new, more realistic positions on a broad range
of policy issues. As this debate continues, the Strategic Studies
Institute presents two independent and differing assessments of
the published doctrine.
LTC Holcomb's assessment sees in this document a
conservative, even traditional approach that does not, in many
cases, offer radical departures from previous policies and
perspectives. The concept of doctrine is, he claims, no different
than what preceded it, and the habit of worst case planning that
characterized Soviet policy is also displayed here. Thus the
overall perspective is shaped by an outlook that is skeptical of
the West and on guard for military dangers, if not threats.
Dr. Boll, on the other hand, argues that while disagreements
may flourish among Russian analysts in the West as to the
relative offensive and defensive aspects of both the new doctrine
and its 1992 draft predecessor that was not formally approved,
there is no question that both documents are firmly integrated
with the overall Russian notion of identified national interests
and preferred means for their protection. Accordingly, he
contends that, for the first time, modern Russian military
doctrine responds to a purely national concept of self-interest
and threat assessment that is not ideological in nature.
Therefore, Russia now has a truly national doctrine that is set
out before the world for consideration. The changes in the
content of Russian military doctrine are historic in nature. But
the alteration in the form of doctrine is truly revolutionary!

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY DOCTRINE
James F. Holcomb
Introduction.
On November 2, 1993, the Russian Security Council and
President Yeltsin finally approved the draft "Provisions of the
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation."1 This long-awaited
development deserves examination to determine the implications of
its adoption for Russia, its neighbors and the West. Several
characteristics make this document unique. First, the need for a
military doctrine can be found embedded deep in the Soviet
military-scientific psyche. The definition of Military Doctrine
itself derives directly from the Soviet era. In the accepted
draft, Military Doctrine is defined as:
A system of views officially adopted by the state on
the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on military
organizational development, on the country's defense
preparation, on the organization of countermeasures to
threats to the state's military security, and on the
utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and
other troops for the defense of the Russian
Federation's vitally important interests.
Virtually nothing distinguishes this definition from its Soviet
predecessors with one exception; that is the addition of "other
troops" in the defense of Russian interests. This is a reference
to internal and border troops and serves to satisfy a practical
detail.
Second, the timing of the release of the doctrine lends
credence to suspicions that this was one of Yeltsin's "payoffs"
to the military for their "support" during the crisis in October.
Indeed, a first draft Military Doctrine was published in May 1992
and was "under discussion" since that time. General Staff
officers repeatedly expressed their frustration that they could
not get the doctrine approved by the government due to the
political turmoil in Moscow. It is interesting, then, that the
first agenda item at the first Security Council meeting on
October 6, after the crushing of the Parliamentary rebellion was
the Military Doctrine. It also was apparently hastily done. The
approved doctrine is substantially different from the May 1992
draft and there was probably little input from ministries or
agencies outside of the Ministry of Defense.
Third, as the Minister of Defense, General Grachev, and
others point out, it is the first time that an approved Military
Doctrine has been laid down in written form. The impetus for this
began in the late 1980s with the announcement of the "defensive"
Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine. Originally ideologically motivated
with important propaganda objectives, this impetus led to the

publication in November 1990 of a draft Soviet Military Doctrine.
Although never officially accepted, the precedent was set.
However, the publication of the current "provisions" has
different objectives and target audiences. First, it is intended
to provide a compass bearing for the Russian Armed Forces,
currently undergoing tremendous disruption. It is also intended
to make clear to the West and the former Soviet republics what
Russia considers in its interests in the "near abroad" (former
republics) and the prerogatives it feels it enjoys in that
regard; in short a prescription for military activities in its
own sphere of influence. Finally, it serves as a warning to
groups within Russia hostile to the Yeltsin regime or the
Federation that the military is now prepared and capable of
performing an internal role.
A final point concerning the document is that it makes clear
that the Military Doctrine is an inherent part of an overall
Russian Security Concept and is applicable for the "transitional
period." This provides some built-in flexibility in dealing with
internal and external security challenges as they arise. It is
important to note that the "transitional period" is not described
either in character or duration. According to General Manilov,
deputy secretary of the Security Council, this was done
intentionally so that "the `theses' can be adjusted to possible
changes in the political, military and economic situation as well
as the international situation."
There has been substantial analysis already of the content
of the provisions of the Military Doctrine itself. My intention
is to concentrate on the implications of some of the most
important tenets as they apply to internal and external Russian
policy.
Russian Citizens Abroad.
The provisions make it clear that the issue of Russian
citizens abroad is still at the forefront of Russian foreign
policy. The doctrine states that among the sources of external
military danger to the Russian Federation is included "the
suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of
citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states." However,
this is not a new provision. It was included in the May 1992
draft as well and in even stronger language:
The violation of the rights of Russian citizens and
those ethnically and culturally identified with Russia
in the former republics of the USSR could be a serious
source of conflict.
The implication of this, however, remains the same. It
provides justification for the introduction of Russian forces
into newly sovereign states if perceived "suppression" of Russian
minorities occurs. Such a provision must be alarming to Latvia

and Estonia, both with large Russian minorities and currently
involved in difficult negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian
forces. It can be no less alarming to Moldova which already has
Russian forces on its territory in the Transdniester region which
has a large Russian minority. Parenthetically, such a provision
could also be used as a pretext for retaining or establishing a
strategic presence in the near abroad in support of Russian
imperial pretensions. This has special implications for other
former republics as well, notably in the Transcaucasus, Ukraine
and Central Asia.
Direct Military Threats.
Although the possibility of world war has been reduced, the
doctrine acknowledges that it is still possible. Such a
development could occur as result of the expansion of "local wars
and armed conflicts" especially if an external power is involved.
This is a traditional General Staff assessment and mirrors the
1992 draft doctrine.
External threats to the Russian Federation grow out of
potential military dangers. Two are significant for
consideration. First, the doctrine defines as a potential
military threat "the buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on
the borders of the Russian Federation sufficient to disrupt the
prevailing correlation of forces." This reflects a traditional
General Staff capabilities-based methodology for determining
potential military threats. The result of using such a
methodology is a consistent tendency toward the worst case with
little political (or other) consideration. That this should
appear in the political section of the doctrine implies that the
General Staff's correlation of forces methodology could be the
basis of a political assessment of a potential military threat.
This in turn nurtures traditional Soviet and Russian
overestimation of potential threats based purely on military
capabilities and the suspicion and distrust that would derive
from such a process. Recently, for example, military sources
leveled serious complaints about NATO's harmonization process
whereby old Turkish equipment is replaced with more modern
equipment cut from West European inventories under CFE.
Along the same lines, "the introduction of foreign troops in
the territory of neighboring states" also constitutes a direct
military threat to the Russian Federation. This is a carry-over
from the 1992 draft, as well, with an important exception:
Peacekeeping forces deployed under the auspices of the U.N.
Security Council or a regional organ of collective security with
the agreement of the Russian Federation (emphasis mine). This
constitutes a Russian veto on collective peacekeeping operations
in states bordering the Russian Federation and by extension
arrogates that role to Russia itself. It also technically
precludes stationing of nonindigenous NATO forces in any future
new member state sharing a border with Russia. This again

reflects the vulnerability currently felt by the General Staff
and the perceived requirement to maintain a security buffer zone
around the periphery of Russia.
Nuclear Issues.
Initial Western reports on the Military Doctrine reacted
with alarm to the dramatic reversal of the traditional Soviet "no
first use" policy. What the doctrine reflects in reality is
acknowledgement by the Russian military of what was always true,
that the primary role of nuclear weapons is deterrence.
Contributing to this point is the increased vulnerability Russian
military thinkers feel as a result of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the dismal state of Russian conventional forces. Added
to that is uncertainty over Ukrainian motives and intentions with
regard to the weapons located on their territory. It also serves
as a marker to China and other potential nuclear states in the
Far East.
Strangely enough, even though the General Staff recognizes
the deterrent role of nuclear weapons, they (in the doctrine)
still advocate the ultimate reduction of nuclear weapons to zero,
a long-held Soviet position. This rejects, at least in principle,
any form of appreciation for "minimal deterrence," that is, a
dramatically lower level that still is sufficient for deterrence
purposes.
Implicit in this is the provision for the use of nuclear
weapons in response to a conventional attack on strategic
systems. This is a carry-over as well from the 1992 draft and
clear recognition of the threat of highly accurate long range
conventional weapons, a lesson taken from the Gulf War.
Within the doctrine there also is a thinly veiled warning to
Ukraine concerning the systems on its territory. Included among
the "direct military threats" to Russia are
actions of other countries which hinder the functioning
of Russian systems for the support of the strategic
nuclear forces and of state and military command and
control of, above all, their space component.
The doctrine therefore legitimizes the use of military force
in response to a perceived attempt by an inheritor state to
actually gain control over nuclear systems. This is an implicit
warning to Ukraine to desist from attempting to gain operational
control over strategic systems still located there.
Internal Use of Armed Forces.
In a major departure from the 1992 draft doctrine and
previous public statements by the military leadership, the armed
forces now have an expanded role for internal use within Russia.

This is an obvious justification for the employment of the armed
forces against the Parliament in October and a thinly veiled
warning to other groups that could possibly oppose Yeltsin and
his regime. In fact, the draft doctrine, in contrast to its
predecessor, actually breaks "military threats to Russia" into
external and internal categories. The definition of potential
threats is wide ranging:
Illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other
organizations which is aimed at destabilizing the
situation in the Russian Federation or violating its
territorial integrity and which is carried out using
armed violence; attempts to overthrow the
constitutional system by force or to disrupt the
functioning of organs of state power and
administration.
In addition, organized crime, contraband activity and
narcotics trafficking fall into this category. Identified as a
"considerable danger" are "internal armed conflicts which
threaten the vitally important interests of the Russian
Federation and may be used as an excuse for other states'
intervention in its internal affairs." The Russian Armed Forces
are explicitly charged with assisting the internal affairs organs
and troops in localizing and suppressing outbreaks of internal
unrest and in efforts against organized crime, smuggling and
narcotics. In addition, they can be used to reinforce the Border
Guards (as in Tadzhikistan) in securing the state border. This is
a much wider role for the armed forces than previously
acknowledged; it remains to be seen what kind of constitutional
mechanism (if any) will be employed to govern such internal use.
Force Structure.
The argument over future Russian force structure has
apparently been resolved in Grachev's favor. His concept of
large, rapidly deployable mobile forces based on an airborne
forces model initially met resistance within the military
establishment, notably the General Staff and the ground forces
which wanted to build on the former Soviet infrastructure and
unit basis. The doctrine now codifies the development of mobile
forces as a seperate category within the Russian Armed Forces.
This will mark a fundamental shift from the traditional Soviet
model of a large number of cadre units filled with mobilizable
reserves to a smaller force with fewer divisions at higher
readiness.
There is no fundamental change to the system of manning the
armed forces which combines conscription with voluntary contract
service. Currently about 15 percent of the armed forces are
contracted servicemen with a target of 50 percent to be reached
by 2000. The concept of extraterritorial stationing of conscripts
also remains. Retention of the conscription system recognizes two

factors: first, the need to maintain a mobilizable reserve, and,
second, simple costs. What has changed is the anticipated end
strength of the armed forces. The former Supreme Soviet codified
in the Law on Defense a manning level approximating 1 percent of
the population. It also expanded the number of categories of
allowable draft deferrals; this put extreme pressure on the
manning system resulting in tremendous shortfalls. The legislated
endstrength objective was to be 1.5 million by the year 2000. Due
to the conscription shortfall, General Grachev stated they would
not even be able to make that and 1 million was closer to the
truth. Since publication of the provisions, General Grachev and
others have revised those figures upward to 1.9 million. Some of
that may reflect the reduction in deferral categories after the
events of October and anticipation that the conscription system
can be fixed; more likely, it was a compromise with those in the
General Staff who want larger standing peacetime forces and a
larger trained mobilizable reserve. In any event, acquiring
funding to maintain the larger aggregate contract manning will be
difficult; General Grachev has recently complained that the Duma
is only prepared to provide 47 percent of the defense funding
requested for 1994. This certainly makes rapid
professionalization problematic. Overall, however, it appears
that the Russian Armed Forces are intended to be smaller, more
mobile and maintained at higher readiness.
Future War Concepts.
The 1992 draft doctrine went into considerable detail on the
characteristics of future war. Much of that was influenced
heavily by Russian military perceptions of the coalition success
in the Gulf War and their own military scientific analysis. That
analysis did not carry over into the new doctrine. What does
appear, however, is the militarily correct and obvious statement
that
the forms, methods and means of conducting combat
operations which best accord with the prevailing
situation and ensure that the initiative is seized and
the aggressor is defeated must be chosen.
This has put the old debate over defensive/counteroffensive
operations to bed. Russian forces must be capable of both
offensive and defensive operations in all circumstances. The
provisions also allow for the continued possibility of a world
war arising out of a local war. However, "the main danger to
stability and peace is posed by local wars and armed conflicts.
The likelihood of their arising in certain regions is growing,"
notably in the regions to the south of Russia. What is missing
here is the hostile rhetoric of the previous draft doctrine.
General Grachev and others are quick to point out that this
doctrine does not address a "probable enemy" as in the past. It
clearly recognizes the immediate security challenges to Russia
arising on the periphery while acknowledging the danger of not

containing them rapidly.
Peacekeeping.
Peacekeeping operations occupy a significant place in the
new doctrine. This is to be expected. In addition to the
reference to U.N. sanctioned operations, the provisions allow for
peacekeeping operations in accordance with "international
obligations," notably under CIS auspices. Specific reference is
made to operations in the near abroad in coordination with
internal and border troops. The detail in describing the
peacekeeping mandate serves to legitimize ongoing "peacekeeping"
operations in Transdniestria, the Caucasus and Tadzhikistan while
allowing similar provisions for potential operations in other
states in the future. Peacekeeping serves as a legitimate pretext
for Russian forces operating in the near abroad and could satisfy
other perceived strategic requirements at the same time. It
should be noted that Russian efforts to gain a U.N. or CSCE
mandate and financial backing for their operations in the near
abroad have so far failed. Without such a mandate, the U.N. and
CSCE also sacrifice any control over Russian peacekeeping
operations. The result is that CIS-mandated operations take on a
distinctly Russian character; the difference between the near
abroad and a Russian sphere of influence becomes potentially
narrow indeed.
Military-Technical and Economic Issues.
In clear reaction to the tremendous effect that economic
disruption has had on military production and acquisition, the
entire third section of the provisions is devoted to this theme.
The provisions argue for constant and significant support for
research and development, production and fielding of the most
modern military equipment. This section also argues implicitly
for Russian independence and self-sufficiency in this regard. For
example, "ensuring the military-technical and economic
independence of the Russian Federation in the conditions of
transition to a market economy" and "improving the system of
state management of the development and production of weapons,
military and special hardware in conditions of changing forms of
ownership." In other words, market economies and private
ownership are acceptable as long as they do not impact on
military production. Further evidence of this is seen in the
argument for the organization of research and development of
advanced technologies "to replace imported ones, including dual
purpose technologies." Most of all, the provisions argue for the
funding to support a robust development program. This is an
important marker and commits the government to rebuilding the
system of funding, research and development, defense orders and
production which has been so seriously disrupted by the collapse
of the old system and the reforms. Some of this figures
prominently in current debate on the overall budget in general
and the military budget in particular. It may be that the

Russians are truly discovering that one way to control militaries
is through the budgeting process. However, it is difficult to
separate military issues, procurement issues and the political,
economic and social impact of underfunding the defense industry.
In other words, budgetary decisions that affect the military and
defense industry can have a profound effect as well on those
charged with taking them, especially in the volatile political
and social environment that is Russia today.
Conclusions.
The adoption of the Russian Military Doctrine marks an
important watershed in the development of the Russian armed
forces and military policy. It serves as a barometer of current
thinking and a compass bearing for further development. It also
serves as a legitimizing document for recent past phenomena and
current operations with open ended provisions for future
possibilities. Internally, it identifies a role for the armed
forces and warns potential challengers to the regime. The scope
and scale of the described potential internal dangers and threats
present the possibility of liberal interpretation. It remains to
be seen what kind of limiting mechanisms will be established with
regard to the use of the armed forces internally.
Militarily, the doctrine is a rational reflection of
military reality without the ideological baggage of the past.
Military scientists can now deal with theoretical challenges
without the constraints of no first use, nonrecognition of
deterrence and strategic and operational defense. We would expect
to see wide ranging development of concepts for mobile forces,
rapid reaction, crisis management and peacekeeping. We should
also see the end of the debate over future force structure; the
character, size and capability of the future force should become
clearer.
Much of the doctrine was designed for external consumption.
It serves as an important indicator of Russian military views
with regard to its neighbors. The emphasis is clearly on a closer
"relationship" with the former republics using the CIS as a
legitimizing forum. Peacekeeping serves and will serve as the
short-term pretext for military operations abroad.
We can only guess at ultimate Russian objectives in the near
abroad. Suffice it to say that whatever they are, covering a
possible spectrum from re-imperialization to bonafide security
operations at the request of peripheral states, the military
doctrine provides the fundamental precepts by which the military
can support those objectives and at the same time satisfy their
own perceived security requirements that were so seriously
disrupted with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The doctrine
also serves as a message to the rest of the world, especially the
West, that Russia regards the near abroad as within its sphere of
influence and has legitimate national security interests to

pursue in that regard.
The doctrine is described as "transitional." This allows a
somewhat liberal interpretation of its contents and implies that
many of these issues are still up for discussion. It is a
"living" document and more akin to a "white paper" than to a
Military Doctrine in the traditional Soviet sense, which is
understandable as everything in Russia is currently
"transitional." This implies that Russia, its military doctrine
and, by extension, its military are moving from one place to
another. The problem now is that there are many possible paths to
take and many variables affecting the decision. It remains to be
seen in which direction they go.
ENDNOTES
1. Quotations from the doctrine are taken from "Osnovyne
Polozheniya Voennoi Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsiya" (Basic
Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation).
In addition to the official 23-page release, numerous
publications have presented the text in full. See for example,
Izvestia, November 18, 1993, and Rossiiskie Vesti, November 18,
1993. A complete translation appeared in Jane's Intelligence
Review Special Report, January 1994.

THE REVOLUTION IN SOVIET/RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE, 1984-1994
Michael M. Boll
In the spring of 1987, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's
Political Consultative Committee announced an apparent radical
shift in its approach to future conflict. With Soviet Party Chief
Gorbachev in attendance, the Pact reported that henceforth its
military preparations would be informed by a strictly defensive
orientation. As the resulting communique asserted:
The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states
is strictly defensive and proceeds from the fact that
in today's circumstances the use of the military way
for resolving any disputed questions is inadmissible.
Its essence is as follows: Warsaw Pact member states
will never, under any circumstance, begin military
action against any state or alliance whatsoever unless
they themselves become the target of an armed attack.1
Pact forces, the statement continued, would never use nuclear
forces first, and Pact members had no territorial claims against
any states within Europe or without.2
This emphasis upon defense was subsequently augmented by a
fuller description of precisely what this new doctrine entailed
in both theoretical and practical terms. An authoritative article
in the journal Kommunist stressed the notion of "Defense
Sufficiency" as the guiding rule for present and future military
reforms:
Defensive sufficiency is the most important element of
the military doctrine of socialism [and] functions in
essence as the foundation of all our military
construction, assuming in its turn, the refusal to be
the first to initiate war, preservation of
military-strategic parity at the lowest levels
possible, mutual weapons' reductions up to the point
where no side possesses the physical possibility to
undertake an attack . . . .3
Past disregard for such limiting principles, another article
argued, had led the Soviet Union to undertake an arms race which
rebounded to the harm of both the economic development and the
international position of the state.4 A third article offered
four different models for reconstructing East Bloc forces in
accord with the 1987 doctrinal pledge.5
Despite the clear assertions of major changes in military
orientation and copious discussions in the Soviet press of
Secretary Gorbachev's "New Thinking," many Western observers
remained unimpressed. In an official conversation with U.S.
Secretary of State Schultz in October 1987, Secretary Gorbachev
took the Americans to task for not appreciating the dramatic

changes which had recently occurred. In his reply, Schultz gave
emphasis to the continuing uncertainty in Washington: "The
aspiration to achieve improved U.S.-Soviet relations is mutual.
That skepticism which many among us, as in the past, feel in
relation to the USSR reflects the experience of certain of your
actions. And this experience is disturbing to many." When
challenged to abandon his "old" approach to East-West relations,
Schultz could only respond: "It is necessary to construct our
relations on the basis of reality."6
This sharp exchange between the two leaders occurred after
the Warsaw Pact had announced its new doctrine, after Gorbachev
and Reagan had held their meetings at Geneva and Reykjavik and
less than 2 months before the signing of the treaty banning
intermediate and shorter-range missiles. And while numerous
reasons might be advanced to account for continuing Western
mistrust of East Bloc intentions, a crucial cause lay in
continuing intelligence reports that observable change had yet to
occur in Pact military structure or planning. This author
remembers a 1988 talk by then NATO commander General Galvin which
noted that the only apparent change in Pact strategy, as measured
by their regular military exercises, was that a brief defensive
delay occurred before the mobilized Pact forces began simulation
of their time-honored, grinding offensive into Western Europe.7
Since that time, Pact military documents for this period
have become available due to the unity of East and West Germany.
We now know that as late as 1989, Pact forces exercised an
offensive strategy which included use of 76 tactical nuclear
weapons targeted against the small West German provinces of
Schleswig-Holstein.8 Such an unprecedented assault would be on
behalf of the northern-most tier of a 6-front attack aimed at
conquering all of central and western Europe to the Channel, and
reaching the Bay of Biscay by the 30th day.9 Money was already
printed as occupation currency to be used by East German, Polish
and Czech troops and clearly demarcated areas were assigned to
East German and Soviet troops in a future conquered West
Berlin.10 And as late as the summer of 1990, after the Berlin
Wall had ceased to divide the city, East German forces conducted
a simulated nuclear strike against NATO positions.11 Given this
pattern of behavior as opposed to a "declaration" of defensive
intent, Western anxieties appear more than justified.
To date, the reasons for this obvious disconnect between
announced doctrine and actual behavior remain clouded. The facile
answer of either mutual deception involving Soviet political and
military leaders or efforts by Pact leaders to confound Secretary
Gorbachev seems inadequate. And while it is true that available
evidence suggests significant resistance within the top Soviet
military to Gorbachev's reforms, Gorbachev himself must have had
at least some inkling of how slowly his plans were being
implemented.
The answer to this apparent dilemma lies in the

philosophical and doctrinal inability of the traditional Soviet
military to accept the key principles of Gorbachev's "New
Thinking"; a result of the persistence of past and increasingly
inappropriate Marxist categories of thought. This conservative
reaction was facilitated by the equally strong military tradition
of separateness, a belief that formulation of an adequate defense
was the sole province of military leaders. As an article in the
authoritative journal of the Institute for World Economy and
International Relations noted, military reform on behalf of the
alleged doctrinal changes announced in 1987 long remained closed
to contribution from civilian experts.
The very nature of the Ministry of Defense's official
plan for military reform which has been in motion since
1987 without any discussion with the public and despite
the Minister's just observation that these tasks are
matters for the entire government calls forth mistrust
and serious anxiety. Among the `dilettantes' and
specialists there is the fear that once again, as with
all military programs of the past, this one is being
composed without taking into account the diverse points
of view. [This program] is practically being foisted
upon the higher leadership of the state under the
pretext that its authors are professional and this,
according to the logic of the military, guarantees it
from error.12
Whenever civilian experts and proponents of a new approach
challenged this closed circle of military thought, the answer
always was the same.
The key thesis of the "answer" of the armed forces was
put rather sharply--"an attack" upon the army is
nothing less than a basic part of a campaign to
"restore capitalism" by shattering the foundations of
the socialist state, by the most extreme injury to the
authority of the communist party and the army under its
direction . . . .13
The traditional assumptions and prejudices of Soviet
military thought which called forth such civilian anxiety arose
from a sound grounding in both Marxist thought and Soviet
experience. Basic to this approach was the tenacious belief that
international conflict was the result of antagonistic class
formations not competition among nation-states. Nationalism and
the nation-state were phenomena relating to the emergence of
capitalism in the 18th century--a stage of socioeconomic growth
whose eventual demise was heralded by the Russian workers and
peasant revolution of 1917. By 1936, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics declared in its new constitution that the
domestic environment finally was free of antagonistic classes.
Continuing disputes and purges now reflected hostile leaders and
classes residing abroad and manipulations on behalf of foreign
bourgeois interests. Thus, threat to the Soviet way of life was

formulated in terms of a strict internationalist ideology and not
in terms of particular national values and goals.
To be sure, Stalin's USSR always took pains to protect
itself, but always within the rationalization of being the
motherland and bastion of the world's working class. Such an
approach necessarily affected military assumptions and planning.
In the first place, it clouded military judgment as to the nature
of future conflict; witness the false assumptions of the early
Russian military and government leaders as to the likelihood that
Polish workers would join Russian troops in 1921 in a common
struggle against the Polish bourgeois government. Stalin's
refusal to give credence to British and American warnings of a
German attack in 1941 reflected his belief in a Western
imperialistic desire to undermine the existing Berlin-Moscow
axis.
Equally important, acceptance of class struggle as the key
principle of social organization left the international arena as
the sole realm from which a threat might emerge since classes had
ceased their direct pernicious influence upon domestic Soviet
politics. Later calls by the Gorbachev government to subordinate
class interests to the more general task of ensuring universal
values challenged the specific theoretical underpinnings which
lay at the basis of Soviet military doctrine since the
revolution, while doing little to subordinate military doctrine
to actual and identifiable Soviet national interest.
In brief, Moscow's traditional emphasis upon Marxist
categories precluded military leaders from focusing upon national
interests and national security even in the face of Gorbachev's
demand for an entirely new approach to defense planning. The
entire notion of national security as practiced in the West
lacked clear understanding. As Nikolai Kosolapov noted in 1992,
when discussing the need to create a Russian conception of
national security, "in the USSR such a conception did not, and
was not able to exist, for the Soviet Union as a state was
constructed around an ideology and a party as the means of its
power . . . ."14
A second debilitating aspect of the Soviet military
tradition, combining Marxist preconceptions with the early
experiences of the Soviet republic, was the continued accent upon
the offensive.
In the period of the civil war, the foundations of
military doctrine were formulated concerning the laws
governing defense of the socialist Fatherland.
Following the repulsion of the enemies' attacks by the
new state, not all the leaders were able to calm down
and to limit themselves to the defense of revolutionary
achievements. This was natural, since offensive tasks
stood exclusively at the top rank of the doctrinal
positions of the Red Army, being in accord with the

"revolutionary" spirit of the first proletarian
state.15
By the 1920s, Bolshevik theorist Mikhail Frunze could
augment this ideological inclination toward the offensive with a
report to the Eleventh Party Congress arguing that " the
[existing] shortcomings in material means could be, and must be
compensated for by active partisan and other methods of struggle
which would be able to secure success in difficult and unequal
conditions of armed struggle only in the presence of a single
aim, will and deed."16 As the Russian authors of this study
confirm, this tradition, reinforced by the experiences of World
War II predominated until the end of the 1980s.
Among the most extreme examples yet revealed of this
pernicious combination of ideological interpretation of
proletarian (not national) interests and offensive doctrine is
the detailed plan for a Warsaw Pact conquest of Western Europe
mentioned above. In the past several years, some 25,000 files
containing over 500,000 documents have been discovered in the
document center for the former East German army. These reveal how
". . . in an unambiguous fashion, by means of political decisions
made by the highest officials, the forces of the former Eastern
bloc were so organized that a single option was given for an
offensive and how, through regular exercises, [this plan] was
refined."17
As practiced until the end of the 1980s, Pact doctrine was
aimed at a massive offensive operation, accompanied by nuclear
barrages, designed to insure the conquest of all Western Europe.
Five axes of operation would pass through Western Germany, with a
sixth axis to the south possible under certain circumstances.
These were not simply contingency plans since the participating
units already were assigned, the goals specified and the
potential nuclear targets identified. The sole remaining
requirement was the order to mobilize and move out.18
The first axis of advance consisted of a two-pronged assault
along the Baltic coast designed to conquer Schleswig-Holstein,
and gain control of the Baltic Sea. Between 78 and 90 tactical
nuclear weapons with kilotons ranging from 3 to 100 stood in
support of this assault. South of the Jutland offensive three
additional axes of advance would take Pact troops into the
Netherlands, the Ruhr, and via the famous Fulda Gap into
Frankfurt, with possible expansion into northern France. A fifth
axis passed through Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, over the
Rhine and into France. A sixth, apparently not fully worked out,
foresaw the invasion of neutral Austria and Switzerland, with
continuation into France. A follow-on stage of the fifth and
sixth axes would take Pact forces through France to the Atlantic,
and, via Spain, to the Bay of Biscay.19 As noted above, elements
of this plan complete with nuclear employment were exercised as
late as 1989 and 1990.

The inflexible nature of traditional Soviet military
doctrine and its inability to preserve the integrity of the state
against threats not directly associated with world capitalism
became obvious in the fall of 1991. The creation of a military
system considered by many to be second only to that of the United
State proved totally inadequate to surmount disintegrative forces
which arose within Soviet society itself. Even the rigid system
of domestic control which reduced the number of active dissidents
to a few thousand was incapable of maintaining Soviet power. To
Soviet analyst N. Kosolapov, this was the inevitable result of
the persistent Soviet inability to develop a national security
concept adequate to prescribing means necessary for continuation
of the Soviet state and society.
The security of any living system, whatever might be
its peculiarities, nature, type or forms of
cooperation, is guaranteed in the last resort not only
by protection, but first of all by the vitality
(zhiznesposobnost') of its subjects, their concrete
possibilities in the struggle for survival and
development. The CPSU and the USSR collapsed
independent from their urgently standing guard for
three quarters of a century, independent from the
intrigues of foreign foes and independent from the
machinations of internal disruptive forces. They
collapsed from the absence of a system [ensuring]
vitality. From this one concludes that in practice,
evaluating the vitality of the social organism in a
historical perspective, one must consider and take
account of the most important factors of security of
this organism. A system ensuring security should be
oriented not only on the defense of the organism and
its continuing vitality, but also on the development of
the latter.20
In the modern era, the author continued, ". . . security
demands an analysis of its economic, informational, ecological
and others aspects."21
In retrospect, the inability of traditional Soviet military
doctrine to adequately protect the Soviet state should have
called forth major changes long prior to the 1991 dissolution of
the USSR. The defects of Soviet security planning became evident
in the late 1970s and 1980s. The procurement of a series of new
weapons systems including the infamous SS-20 and renewed Soviet
interference in the Third World gave rise to a concerted U.S. and
NATO response. Reviewing this period, a Soviet author cautioned
that the search for "absolute security for one state is possible
only under conditions of absolute insecurity of the others."22
Once military parity had been achieved with the West, this critic
continued, "we did not always make use of ensuring the security
of the state by political means. The result was an arms race
which unavoidably affected the social-economic development of the
state and its international position."23 In short, near exclusive

emphasis upon the doctrine of inevitable class struggle,
excessive military preparedness and an emphasis upon the
offensive had rebounded to the harm of the very entity, the
Soviet state, which it promised to protect.
The inability of the Soviet Union to develop a broad-based
national security doctrine in which military means would be but
one part of a comprehensive defense of national interests
impacted negatively in ways other than calling forth a
self-defeating arms race with the West. To Soviet thinking,
crucial for the preservation of the socialist way of life was
retention by Moscow of its long cherished reputation as the
acknowledged center of Marxist thought. And yet as the recently
published memoirs of former First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister
Yuli Kvitsinsky reveal, this prestigious position had been under
challenge for decades prior to the dissolution of the USSR.
Recalling his posting to East Berlin in the 1970s, Kvitsinsky
notes that:
[East German Party Leader] Honecker was firmly
convinced that the center of creative Marxism had moved
from Moscow to Berlin, and that the economy of the DDR
was the best within the socialist block. The password
"from the Soviet Union to learn means to learn how to
be victorious" had not been seriously accepted by
anyone for a long time and among the functionaires of
the SED ( Socialist Unity Party) a cause for biting
ridicule. From the Soviet Union there was nothing more
to learn, neither in the realm of industry nor
agriculture nor ideology.24
The impact of growing East German disrespect for the USSR
and its ideals became evident in the manner that Soviet
diplomatic entreaties were rejected at the very moment the USSR
was engaged in a massive arms buildup. According to Kvitsinsky,
East Germany refused to inform Moscow of its secret talks with
Bonn during the 1970s and rejected Soviet advice not to fall too
deeply in debt to Western banks. East German efforts to re-export
materials received from the USSR as a means to improve their own
economy continued despite Soviet protests, and Soviet requests to
address the East German politburo were refused with thinly veiled
comments which suggested that such appearances would reveal the
incompetence of the Soviet comrades.25
The significance of the growing separation from its key
Warsaw Pact ally was not lost on the Soviet foreign ministry.
After an extensive review of policy in 1978, Foreign Minister
Gromyko and the heads of the KGB (Soviet Secret Police) concluded
that East Germany, and by implication a key aspect of the Soviet
defense perimeter, was on the road to ruin.
The report predicted that which would occur in 1989. It
warned that the evangelical church in all probability
would become the focal point of oppositional forces and

pointed to the fact that the apparently so stable
structures of the [East German] party, army and
security system would find themselves, in fact, in a
rapid erosion process.26
With Soviet security efforts concentrated so heavily upon
military means, no solution to the East German problem seemed
possible.
Soviet negotiations with West Germany at the end of the
decade confirm the inability of Moscow's long-standing emphasis
upon military might as adequate defense against a world of class
enemies to advance Moscow's true national interest. A reading of
the copious discussion concerning German unification clearly
reveals that the long-neglected Soviet domestic economy played
the key and commanding role in Gorbachev's approach to this
sensitive issue. 27
Perhaps the clearest indication that misperceived notions of
where the Soviets' true interests lay and confusion as to how
they might best be achieved lies in recent revelations concerning
the 1981 Polish crisis. Documents from Soviet Politburo meetings
allow one to follow the debate as to the wisdom and efficacy of
the application of military force within this key member of the
Warsaw Pact. And the decision was unanimous. Not only was
military force deemed unlikely to resolve the dispute between the
Polish government and the trade union movement, Solidarity, but
the long-term result would be a serious blow to badly-needed
reforms of the Soviet economy. With Soviet Defense Minister
Ustinov in agreement, the Politburo concluded that Moscow's
economic ties with the West--ties central to the continued
functioning of the already imperiled Soviet economy--would be
severed. The central issue for Soviet security had ceased to be a
hostile, class- divided international reality. Rather, economic
failures within the state itself made at least some forms of
class collaboration with the West essential. Apparently unnoticed
by the aging heads of the CPSU, reality once again had revealed
the total inadequacy of past assumptions and actions concerning
perpetuation of the Soviet way of life.28
In the waning days of the Soviet state, a final attempt was
made to draft a more comprehensive security doctrine which might
identify the main threats and the possible means for averting
catastrophe. But the summer 1990 meeting of the Communist Party
Twenty-Eighth Party Congress confirmed continuing problems in
identifying Moscow's true national interests. As the official
report on foreign policy noted:
The absence of a clear-cut conception of state
interests capable of providing a direct link between
the country's internal requirements and its actions in
the international arena is showing up more and more
clearly in our policy. . . . The definition of exactly
what constitutes the country's fundamental state

interests today is by no means an academic problem. Due
to the absence of such a definition and, closely
connected with this, a definition of national security,
our foreign policy is essentially deprived of a stable
foundation both for the elaboration of a long-term
international strategy and for the formation of a broad
democratic consensus in support of it. . . . Due to the
absence of a clear conception of state interests, the
notion of just what national security is remains
incomplete and distorted.29
The confusing blend of ideals and suggestions advanced by
the Gorbachev government provided little basis for drafting a
military doctrine which would detail exactly how and in what
circumstances the Soviet armed forces would protect the as yet
ill-defined national interests. Gorbachev's insistence upon
emphasizing the survival of man in place of the class interests
of the world's proletariat, or creating a "common European House"
merely substituted one set of international values for another.
And while all might agree that no war was better than a war, this
prescription provided little guidance as to possible situations
in which armed intervention or its threat might be required if
the state's interests came into conflict with interests of
another.
As a result, the much-awaited revised military doctrine
finally published in draft form in November 1990 placed near
exclusive stress upon the reactive uses of military power. One
searches this doctrine in vain to discover under what
circumstances force or the threat of force might be employed to
achieve positive goals identified as crucial to the Soviet
national interest. Still devoid of a comprehensive notion of
national interest or national security, the 1990 draft doctrine
necessarily laid emphasis upon the general principles annunciated
by Mikhail Gorbachev during the preceding 4 years. The prevention
of war was declared the overriding goal of both the Soviet state
and its armed forces. "Never, under any circumstances, will it
(the Soviet Union) be the first to began military action against
any state if it or its allies are not the object of armed
aggression."30 Soviet forces were to be reorganized according to
the rules of "sufficiency" which would preclude large scale
offensive action, and their main task was to repel aggression. By
its very tenets, the new draft doctrine assumed henceforth the
Soviet military would play essentially a passive role, seeking to
prevent conflict and, in case of failure, aiming at return to the
situation anti-bellum.31 Within a year of this document's
publication, the USSR ceased to exist, being replaced by a series
of successor states loosely welded together in the new
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
The abortive August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev,
followed in 4 short months by the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the emergence of a Russian republic, set the stage for an
accompanying revolution in military doctrine. For the first time

since 1917, civilian and military leaders were released from the
dead-hand of traditional Soviet doctrine, and were able to began
the difficult task of formulating national interests in whose
service the military could expect to play a major role. To be
sure, this formulation did not come easily since most of the
Russian leaders had received their formative education and
experience under the ancien regime. As the new Russian Foreign
Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, stated 2 months after the Russian
republic was born:
It is particularly difficult for us to return to
"normality." Our country was hostage to messianic ideas
before, especially in the 20th century, ideas which
eclipsed and replaced our national interests. The
communist idea led to expansion and instinctive
confrontation with the surrounding world and imposed
ideological models on it.32
Further complicating the task of identifying both the
national interests and the means for their preservation was the
unclear relationship among the post-Soviet republics. Initially,
it appeared that a common armed force composed of units from the
CIS would replace the Soviet military during a 3-5 year
transition period. But by May 1992, disputes, especially with
Ukraine, led Moscow to create its own national army. Plans for a
broader defense, however, were not abandoned. Rather, a
collective security treaty was signed by those CIS states which
wished some, as yet unclear degree and form of coordination among
the emerging national forces. The result of this confusion was
that the initial military planning in the new Russian republic
retained numerous assumptions as to a CIS-wide defense which,
time would show, had little correspondence to reality.33
If the relationship between Russian and CIS forces remained
clouded in early 1992, the subordination of Russian forces to the
more general goals of national security and national interests
received its first, clear formulation. On May 5, 1992, President
Yeltsin signed the federation law "On Security," which defined
the very notion of national security, identified the major
threats to the new state, and described the diverse forces
available for Russia's defense. In sharp contrast to earlier,
communist days, the notion of security was anchored firmly to
individual and national values:
Security is the situation whereby the vital interests
of the individual, society, and state are secure from
internal and external threat. The following are ranked
as fundamental objects of security: the individual--his
rights and freedoms; society--its material and
spiritual assets; the state--its constitutional system,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.34
The notion of "threat" was consistent with the interests to be
defended, expanded to include "dangers to the vital interests of

the individual, society and state," which could arise "from
internal and external sources. . . ."35
Lest there be any uncertainty as to the role of the Russian
military as but one component of the overall means to defend the
new Russian order, the Security Concept clearly noted that:
Security is secured by the implementation of a unified
state policy in the sphere of ensuring security by a
system of economic, political, organizational and other
means commensurate to the vital interests of the
individual, society, and the state.36
And the resulting list of forces deemed necessary, while
giving prominence to the military, listed such diverse groups as
tax services, organs to ensure the effective running of industry,
public health organs, and information services.
To guarantee that the overall demands of national security
would remain dominant over the means for their realization, the
new law also created a National Security Council among whose
principal tasks would be "formulating the main avenues of Russian
Federation strategy for ensuring security and organizing the
preparation of federal programs."37 Chaired by the Russian
President, and including representation from both the Parliament
and the Council of Ministers, this new organ would discuss
modifications of both doctrine and means. It would debate the
ways by which the national interest best could be preserved.38
In October 1992, the Russian parliament passed legislation
which both codified and broadened the key role of civilian
officials in determining the means and ends of national defense.
Entitled simply "On Defense," the law (Zakon) entrusted the
Supreme Soviet with the responsibility to "determine the military
policies and accept the fundamental propositions of the military
doctrine of the Russian Federation." The President of the
Republic, in turn, would present the military doctrine to the
parliament for its consideration-- undoubtedly following
extensive consideration by the Security Council. The Defense
Ministry, in contrast, was limited to "participating (uchastvuet)
in the working out (razrabotke) of proposals [intended] for the
Supreme Soviet [and] President of the Russian Federation
concerning military policies and military doctrine." The General
Staff also was to "develop proposals with respect to military
doctrine. . . ."39
The dominance of the Russian political authorities in
determining the preferred future status and policies of the
military was not to be executed in a vacuum. After all, the law
"On Defense" clearly stated that the military played an important
role in formulating proposals for defense policies. As a result,
numerous consultations followed between political and military
authorities. In November 1992, Yeltsin chaired an "expanded"
session of the Ministry of Defense Collegium seeking input as to

desired changes in existing policies. Flanking the Russian
President were other civilian officials responsible for defense
doctrine including the President of the Supreme Soviet, the
Vice-President of Russia, and other "responsible" members of the
parliament and cabinet. The subsequent, wide-ranging discussion
raised numerous suggestions and identified pressing problems
which ran the gamut from difficulties in recruitment to
inadequate attention to military doctrine. Such meetings typified
the new relationship between the civilian and military
authorities.40
The following July, the Ministry of Defense hosted a major
conference prepared by the Security Council designed to elicit
additional suggestions on the very notion of national security.
The government received criticism for not elaborating further
upon the Security Concept published the preceding year. And yet
there was clear agreement that the over-arching concept of
security played the central role in coordinating the various
policies aimed at ensuring the survival of the Russian Republic.
"The fundamental doctrinal document, in the opinion of the
participants, ought to be based on the constitution, on accepted
laws and be, by its very nature, a basis for concepts and
doctrines of all spheres of security: economic, political,
social, military, ideological, etc."41 The conference concluded
by offering an extensive list of potential threats for future
consideration. These challenges to the continued survival of the
republic were by no means restricted to those in the military
domain. "External" threats included problems in the political
sphere such as ethnic and religious disputes and instability of
governments in surrounding lands. Problems in the economic area
listed degradation of Russia's technological potential and
uncontrolled exports of capital. Military threats included local
warfare on Russia's border and the unclear status of Russian
troops on foreign soil. Interestingly, a section also was devoted
to ecological problems as well as threats arising internally such
as organized crime. Among the means necessary to meet these
problems, in addition to military, one found such things as
organs of conservation and institutions designed to protect the
health of the Russian population.42
In May 1992, the first Russian effort to draft a military
doctrine consistent with the new and rapidly changing realities
of Eastern Europe made its appearance. Cleared for publication a
scant 3 weeks after the announcement of the Security Concept and
formation of the Security Council, this new draft retained a few
of the earlier notions as to an augmented sphere of military
activity. Thus military doctrine was defined as an "historical
category," although the draft document later emphasized that "The
SUPREME goal of Russia's policy in the sphere of national
security is to ensure favorable peaceful conditions for
socioeconomic and spiritual development and the creation of
adequate living conditions for all its people" and that "Russia's
military doctrine is a component part of the concept of national
security. . . ."43

Appearing in the same month as the creation of the national
Russian military, and assuming future cooperation with other CIS
forces, the draft doctrine soon became outdistanced by the
rapidly changing political situation. Still, in its entirety it
represented a major step forward in defining actual threats to
the new Russian state. International challenges were identified
as likely to arise from a series of provocative actions
including: (1) efforts by some states to dominate the world
community, (2) the presence of powerful armed forces in a number
of states, and especially their basing near the Russian frontier,
(3) instability of the international military-political
situation, and 4) efforts to use economic or military blackmail
against Russia.44
Two additional threats were discerned in this initial
formulation. The violation of the rights of the estimated 25
million Russian citizens now residing outside the motherland was
identified as "a serious source of conflict." Additionally,
"Russia will view the introduction of foreign troops on the
territory of contiguous states . . . as a direct military
threat."45 To meet such threats, the Russian military would
include permanent readiness forces, mobile reserves, and
strategic reserves.
The force structure foreseen by the doctrine would deploy
when needed within the larger defense plans of the still-existing
combined CIS force. The central position of the CIS was
enumerated in several places, making it obvious that some form of
combined defense was anticipated.
Russia proceeds from the assumption that its security
is inseparable from that of the other Commonwealth
states. The defense of Russia and of the Commonwealth
as a whole can be ensured with greatest effectiveness
by the joint efforts of the CIS countries with
centralized operational leadership of their collective
defense.46
As late as the fall of 1992, retired
Danilovich could devote a 21-page article
drafting a CIS military doctrine adequate
Unfortunately, the combined CIS force was
months later.

Colonel-General A.A.
to the various means of
to combined defense.47
officially dissolved 6

Despite the provisional if revolutionary nature of this
draft doctrine, its contents were subject to serious criticism by
analysts in the West. Contrasts were drawn with the earlier, 1990
Soviet draft to the detriment of the Russian version. A new sense
of aggressiveness was inferred from alterations in wording, more
detailed depiction of potential threats, and likely responses
which suggested that Russia might use force in protection of her
own national interests. As British analyst Charles Dick reflected
in his comparison of the 1990 and 1992 drafts:

The new draft doctrine, like the old, views the world
through the distorted prism of ideological hostility
towards the West, though this is implicit rather than
explicit. It persists in exclusively worst case
analysis and fails to recognize that this approach,
which was a major cause of the collapse of the Soviet
economy, will, if persisted in, do the same for
Russia's.48
Similar negative appraisals were offered by American analyst
Mary FitzGerald who concluded:
Finally, the 1990 doctrine emphasized that the Soviet
military art was based on a defensive strategy and that
the USSR excluded the option of a preemptive strike.
Defense was to be the main type of military action at
the outset of war. In 1992, however, these provisions
were deleted. Instead, the Russian armed forces will
conduct "all forms of military action," will conduct
defense and offense equally, and will seize the
strategic initiative to destroy the opponent.49
It is difficult to know what one should make of such
criticism. For the first time in decades, a Russian military
doctrine was specifically subordinated to a general Security
Concept which emphasized national and not ideological interests.
To be sure, the 1992 Doctrine was more assertive than its 1990
predecessor. Perhaps most worrisome was the implication that in
identifying the introduction of foreign troops on the territory
of contiguous states as a direct military threat, the Russian
General Staff had relegated to itself determination of what
constituted cause for war. If such were the case, one can only
hope that the continuing evolution of democratic processes in the
Russian political system would one day remedy such usurpation.
But aside from this point, the Doctrine in general appeared
proper for one of the world's major military powers. Surely, no
one would fault other states, such as the United States or Great
Britain if they identified buildups of forces on their frontier
as actual threats. Few would object if the resulting military
planning included offensive options or stated that in case of
conflict the aim would be to "repel aggression and defeat the
opponent." Yet it was precisely these formulations that brought
charges of reactionary thought in the West. One can only wonder
who it was that truly remained a prisoner of "Old Thinking."
Where the 1992 Doctrine most deserved criticism was in its
incomplete identification of the full range of threats to
Russia's national interests. And this lack, in part, resulted
from the still incomplete civilian analysis of the likely events
within the tumultuous CIS and in the border states of Eastern
Europe long regarded as a buffer against potential invaders.
Equally important, the 1992 Doctrine failed to include a section
as to military responsibility in case of domestic violence and

unrest--situations which were almost unknown in the recent past.
To remedy these flaws, the new Russian government (only
independent for 4 months when the 1992 draft appeared) needed
time to examine the situation and environment in which it now
found itself. As we now know, these issues were under active
consideration in several parts and bureaucracies of government,
including the Security Council.
In the summer of 1993, the former Secretary of the Russian
Security Council gave a lengthy interview detailing work
completed on a new military doctrine. As expected, a sharp
contrast was drawn between the way such doctrines had emerged in
the past, and present efforts. In the Soviet period, Yuri Skokov
noted, the state designed its doctrine to defend an ideology;
today, doctrine aimed at ensuring national security. And when
challenged as to whether such a new military doctrine existed,
Skokov quickly responded: "It does."50
The delay in offering the completed document, Skokov hinted,
stemmed from the complex task of assessing the major changes
which had occurred since the demise of the Soviet Union and
creation of a national Russian state.
It was said [in the past] that we have an enemy and we
must deliver a first strike against the aggressor. Then
there was some kind of invention during Gorbachev's
time--about defense doctrine. But this was not a
military doctrine, merely a declaration.Work on the
military doctrine was based on the following
fundamental arguments. The political situation has
changed. Yesterday it was a matter of us and them.
Today we have no potential enemy and there is no point
in saying that there is a specific enemy who poses a
threat and we are forming a group to repulse him. On
the other hand we are faced with all too many factors
representing a threat, and these may in theory shake
the foundations of the state and territorial
integrity.51
In November 1993, the new and lengthy Russian Military
Doctrine was signed by President Yeltsin following extensive
consideration by his security council. The actual document
remained classified, perhaps awaiting some revision prior to
submission to Parliament as required under law. Still, its basic
provisions received detailed discussion and summarization in the
daily press. Acknowledging that the new doctrine was designed to
guide Russia during the new transition period, its first sentence
confirmed that "The fundamental provisions of the military
doctrine of the Russian Federation are a constituent part of the
conception of security of the Russian Federation. . . ."52 The
doctrine itself was divided into a series of subsections covering
key issues such as (1) political aspects of the military
doctrine, (2) the basic sources of military threat, (3) the
fundamental directions for ensuring the military security of the

Russian Federation, (4) means needed to ensure military security,
plus a number of chapters relating to the structure, support, and
commitment of the military in the future.53
Appraisals of the new doctrine naturally varied as diverse
critics focused upon one or another section of this lengthy
compilation. Some analysts emphasized the implicit offensive
threat contained in the doctrine's acceptance of the use of
nuclear weapons against states allied with or assisting powers
attacking Russia. Among the more judicious and insightful
assessments were the conclusions of veteran political observer
Theo Summer of the German weekly Die Zeit:
In the West, three points in particular in the twenty
three page document prompt suspicion. The first is the
removal of a decree that the size of the armed forces
was limited to one percent of the population (about 1.5
million soldiers). The second concerns the roll being
assigned to the military as a guarantor of Russian
integrity--in harmony with the laws and alongside the
troops of the Interior Ministry. The third lies in the
expressed claim of a right to intervene in the "Near
Abroad."54
Speaking to this last, perhaps most disturbing change, Sommer
concluded that even the most democratic, most pro-western Russia
possible still would demand the right to protect its compatriots
abroad:
We should not fool ourselves: When it concerns the fate
of 25 million Russians who, as flotsam of history
remain in the adjoining republics, a democratic,
open-to-the-west with respect to military and economic
cooperation, Russia would neither wish to abrogate its
protective role nor be able to do so.55
The sole alternative to conceding Russia a preeminent position in
safeguarding the external Russian minority would be for the
United Nations to assume this burden: a most unlikely prospect.
A clause-by-clause, painstaking examination of each section
of the Military Doctrine far exceeds the purpose of this
monograph. Rather, it is the scope and the comprehensive nature
of the document which deserve comment. For the first time,
domestic problems which might promote disorder were accorded
importance equal to threats which might arise abroad. Many of the
same foreign threats were enumerated as in the 1992 Doctrine, and
the need for stability along Russia's extensive frontier received
expected stress. And once again, the suppression of the rights of
Russians remaining outside the Federation was identified as a
major source of military threat. An extensive, concluding section
listed the forms of economic and technical support required if
the military was to carry out its proposed security function. And
yet if the doctrine itself was lengthy and complex, the reasons

for its existence were succinctly summarized in the document
itself.
The main goal of the construction of the Armed Forces
and other services of the Russian federation is the
creation and development of military forces capable of
ensuring the defense of the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the country, the security
of its citizens and of other vital interests of society
and the state, taking account of the military-political
and strategic situation in the world and the real
possibilities of the Russian Federation.56
In this central paragraph, as well as in the doctrine
itself, lay convincing proof of the revolution in Russian
military doctrine which had transpired over a 10-year period. To
be sure, Western critics might again object that under certain
situations Russia could apply military force in resolution of
pressing problems, and conclude that a more aggressive spirit
dominated Russian thought than a few years before. But this was
to be expected in a nation which sought to take its rightful
place as one of the world's great powers. By the early months of
1994, the coincidence of proclamations emanating from the Russian
Foreign Office as to Moscow's special interests in states along
the frontier coincided nicely with the potential threats
identified in the Military Doctrine. Demands that the rights of
Russians still residing abroad be respected matched perfectly
with military proclamations that such issues remained a potential
threat. Involvement of Russian troops in the Georgian civil war
facilitated the signing of economic and political agreements
between Tiblisi and Moscow. In short, Russian military doctrine
finally was part and parcel of an overall national strategy
designed to preserve and promote Russian national interests. The
West might debate whether Russia would become a threat or not,
but the interests which Russia was pledged to defend were, for
the first time in decades, clear for all to see. And interests
which were identifiable were always fair game for diplomatic
discussions and compromise. Only a pessimist would view this
situation as more threatening than what had gone before.
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